Supplementary Appendix to:
"Demanding Truth: The Global Transitional Justice Network and the Creation of Truth Commissions," by Kelebogile Zvobgo, in *International Studies Quarterly*

Appendix A

Defining Truth Commissions

I draw on Hayner's seminal *Unspeakable Truths* (2001, 2011) as the authoritative text on truth commissions. A truth commission "(1) is focused on the past, rather than ongoing, events; (2) investigates a pattern of events that took place over a period of time; (3) engages directly and broadly with the affected population, gathering information on their experiences; (4) is a temporary body with the aim of concluding with a final report; and (5) is officially authorized or empowered by the state under review" (2011: 11-12). This is the most widely used definition in the literature (Olsen et al., 2010 *JPR*). Using Hayner's definition, I identified a universe of 84 truth commissions from 1970 to 2018, offering the most comprehensive list of truth commissions to date. 48 of these operated in transitional contexts, i.e., within 10 years of the end of internal armed conflict, government killing of civilians, or autocracy during the period, 1970 to 2018 (Kreutz 2010; Eck and Hultman 2007; Pettersson and Eck 2018; Boix, Miller and Rosato 2013).

A Note on Conflicting Perspectives on Truth Commissions

Some scholars and legal practitioners suggest that governments respond to calls for justice with truth commissions in an effort to actually avoid justice. Adherents to this school of thought hold that only trials represent "true" or "real" justice and that commissions and other mechanisms are simply tools to co-opt civil society's demands for accountability. However, we should not assume that the installation of a commission or other mechanism will pacify, let alone satisfy, civil society. History gives us every reason to expect that civil society groups will continue the fight if they do not achieve what they seek and if government efforts are not genuine or robust. What's more, as seen in the case of Guatemala, it is usually domestic civil society groups that first articulate the need for transitional justice and, more specifically, truth commissions, among a range of measures. Where we might fear governments using commissions to get HR-INGOs to 'leave them alone' is where domestic civil society is left out of the adoption, design, and implementation process. Yet, even here, we should expect domestic groups to mobilize and communicate to their international counterparts their objections to a top-down process.

Details on Quantitative Data

Selection of Independent Variables: Part One

There are a range of domestic civil society groups that have proven helpful, if not pivotal, to the adoption and implementation of truth commissions since their first uses in the 1970s and 1980s – human rights groups, churches, economic associations, women's rights groups, lawyer's guilds, etc. The V-Dem Project's core civil society index both includes these and related groups, and, very importantly, captures the extent to which civil society is autonomous from the state and is able to freely and actively pursue civic and political goals. Given this, the core civil society index is an appropriate measure. Further, the V-Dem Project's coverage across time and space is unmatched.

   Amnesty is a prominent TJ promoter and is, thus, a useful HR-INGO from which to draw data. In addition, Amnesty is uniquely poised to influence domestic and international policy making due to its global prominence and the high evidentiary standard of its publications (Skaar and Wiebelhaus-Brahm

2013). Through its reports, Amnesty transmits information and facilitates buy-in for accountability for a range of stakeholders, including target governments and foreign governments. To be clear, Amnesty's objective or strategy is not to dictate specific modalities of accountability, for example criminal trials against specific individuals or the deployment of a truth commission. Interview data indicates that HR-INGOs walk on a tight rope and cannot go so far as to instruct exactly what should be implemented in a given country. Were they to do so, they would risk alienating their domestic allies and other compliance constituencies, to say nothing of target governments. The growing scholarship on backlash provides additional support. Rather, as Amnesty and other INGOs shine the light on human rights violations and other abuses, they make a general call for remedies, creating space for domestic groups to indicate what mechanisms they want and providing flexibility to governments to devise appropriate mechanisms.

Finally, with respect to network access, the count measure of INGOs that list a domestic membership base within a country in a given year is a good choice for many of the same reasons as the V-Dem core civil society index. The additive index captures the number of INGOs that list domestic groups from a given country on their membership rosters. These include human rights groups, churches, economic associations, women's rights groups, lawyer's guilds, etc. It is important for purposes of the analysis that the contacts and resources available to domestic groups from abroad are captured in the models. And, similar to the V-Dem project, the UIA Yearbook has very good coverage across time and space.

Additional Information on Variables and Summary Statistics: Part One

I control for a range of potentially confounding factors, namely: the degree to which human rights are respected, domestic political institutional constraints on and opportunities for accountability, diffusion, embeddedness in intergovernmental organizations, wealth, and aid dependence. First, to evaluate whether commissions are adopted where it is relatively "harder" or "easier" to account for periods of political violence within the broader context of state practice, I control for the level of human rights respect, drawing on data from Fariss (2014). Second, to assess if commissions are less likely to be adopted where there are viable alternatives avenues for justice, I control for the level of judicial independence, using the latent variable developed by Linzer and Staton (2015), which draws on a range of indicators of *de jure* and behavioral judicial independence. Latent judicial independence captures judges' autonomy and other branches' deference to/respect for judicial decisions. Third, to assess if commissions are less likely to be adopted where there are many veto players, I use the the Political Constraints III index from Henisz (2002). This index interacts the number of independent branches of government, namely the executive and legislature, with their ability to veto policy. The index also accounts for the distribution of preferences across branches of government. The more veto players and the greater the level of inter-branch fractionalization, the greater the political constraints. Fourth, to measure regional diffusion, I use a count of precedents in geographic neighbors based on the United Nations sub-regional division of the world (Kim 2012*b*). I also account for time (or, global diffusion), using a simple count of the number of years since 1970. Fifth, I control for membership in IGOs, in which a country might be additionally pressured to adopt TJ and, in particular, a commission. Data on IGO membership also come from the UIA *Yearbook* and the Correlates of War Project. Finally, to account for the possibility that high-capacity or aid-dependent states are more likely to adopt commissions, I control for a country's gross domestic product per capita (logged) and official development assistance as a percentage of GDP. I also control for a country's population (logged). These measures are drawn from World Bank's World Development Indicators. Table A1 provides summary statistics for variables used in the analysis in Part One.

Table A1: Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Part One

	Mean	Min	Max	N
Strong Domestic Civil Society	0.45	0.02	0.96	668
HR-INGO Naming and Shaming	5.98	0	35.33	527
Network Access (*ln*)	5.81	0	7.94	650
Human Rights Respect	-1.08	-2.75	1.83	674
Judicial Independence	0.27	0.02	0.96	665
Veto Players	0.15	0	0.67	651
Regional Diffusion	2.04	0	10	676
Global Diffusion	26.62	0	47	676
IGO Membership (*ln*)	3.66	0	4.33	651
GDP per capita (*ln*)	7.03	5.07	10.31	620
ODA as % of GDP	0.06	0.02	0.36	587
Population (*ln*)	16.77	11.25	20.64	674
Conflict Duration	3.25	0	40.36	269
Conflict Intensity	0.49	0	1	268
Civilian Killings (*ln*)	4.80	3.22	13.12	320
Democracy Breakdowns	0.79	0	4	86

Degree of Correlation between the Independent Variables

Readers may wonder how much the explanatory variables in Part One are correlated as this could influence the standard errors in the models. The variables are related, but weakly so. The variables *strong domestic civil society* and *network access* have a Pearson's correlation coefficient, ρ of 0.36. Meanwhile, the variables *network access* and *HR-INGO naming and shaming* have a Pearson's ρ of 0.25. Finally, there is a slightly negative correlation between the variables *strong domestic civil society* and *HR-INGO naming and shaming* (Pearson's ρ = -0.04).

Managing Non-Randomness of the Sample

Readers may have concerns about the non-random nature of the sample, specifically that some of the variables that I use may not only explain truth commission adoption but also democratic transition or conflict termination. Put differently, the effect of the independent and control variables may be mediated through transitions. Table A2 produces the results of models using the nearest-neighbor matching (NNM) technique described in Abadie and Imbens (2006; 2011). Similarity between subjects is estimated using a weighted function of the independent variables – *Strong domestic civil society*, *HR-INGO naming and shaming*, and *Network access* – as well as the control variables for each observation.

The average treatment effect (of democratic transition) is calculated by taking, for each subject, the mean of the difference between the observed outcome and imputed outcome (truth commission adoption). And, since matching on a range of covariates can itself generate bias, I implement the bias adjustment option included in Stata's `teffects nnmatch` package. Using the NNM technique, I find that the average treatment effect of democratic transition is a 4-percentage-point increase in the likelihood of truth commission adoption. However, this difference is not statistically significant at a conventional error level. Next, I find the average treatment effect of conflict termination is a 2-percentage-point decrease in the likelihood of truth commission adoption. However, as with democratic transition, the difference is not statistically significant at a conventional error level. So, while the sample may not be random, the type of transition does not significantly bias my results.

Table A2: Nearest-Neighbor Matching

Truth Commission	(1)	(2)
ATE		
r1vs0.Democratic Transition	0.04	
	(0.07)	
r1vs0.Conflict Termination		-0.02
		(0.03)
Observations	469	469

Standard errors in parentheses

All models report clustered standard errors by country.

[+] $p < 0.10$, [*] $p < 0.05$, [**] $p < 0.01$

Additional Information on Variables and Summary Statistics: Part Two

I control for several potential confounding variables, in particular: the subject of inquiry, diffusion, transition, and regime type. First, to account for the possibility that the subject of inquiry influences institutional design, I use two dichotomous indicators, one that captures whether or not a commission was adopted to account for abuses perpetrated during an <u>authoritarian government</u> and another that captures whether the commission was adopted to account for abuses perpetrated during a <u>civil war</u>. The omitted categories are commissions adopted as a response to government killings of civilians, coups, foreign occupation, etc. Second, it may be that some mandate design features more often appear in some geographic regions than in others. The story here would be that governments replicate their neighbors' practices. To account for <u>regional diffusion</u>, I calculate, for a given country, the number of commissions in its geographic sub-region that possessed a given investigative power. I also account for time, or <u>global diffusion</u>, using a simple count of the number of years since 1970. Third, commissions adopted during <u>political transitions</u> may have stronger mandates than commissions adopted outside of transitions. Transitional commissions likely have a higher issue salience than non-transitional commissions. Transitions represent an opportunity to "get things right" and can provide a window for the ICTJ, to prevail upon governments to design a strong commission. Thus, I include a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if a commission was adopted within five years of the abuses outlined in its mandate. Fourth, and finally, commissions installed by <u>democratic regimes</u> may be more likely to have strong mandates. An established body of scholarship finds that democracies are more likely to credibly commit to a variety of human rights instruments and institutions. This logic naturally extends to commissions. Thus, I include Boix, Miller and Rosato's dichotomous measure of democracy.

Selection into ICTJ Assistance

Governments generally initiate a relationship with the ICTJ, though they are sometimes invited by domestic NGOs who then connect them with policy makers. But, in no cases does the organization get involved without an invitation. Of course, the ICTJ does not always accept invitations. In particular, the organization does not enter contexts where "it seems that the government doesn't have a credible commitment to [implementing] a commission," for example in Serbia.[22] Thus, it is possible that the ICTJ lends its expertise to countries where having a strong commission is easier. While a possibility, the descriptive statistics in the next section show that the ICTJ has been involved in a variety of countries—in places as "easy" as Canada and as "difficult" as Côte d'Ivoire. As seen in Table A3, the ICTJ has advised nearly one-third of all commissions. 39% of commissions have considered abuses perpetrated during civil wars and 69% have examined abuses perpetrated under authoritarian governments. Approximately

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[22]Author interview with Priscilla Hayner.

two-thirds of commissions in the sample were adopted under democratic regimes and two-thirds during political transitions.

Table A3: Summary Statistics of Independent Variables Used in Part Two

	Mean	Min	Max	N
ICTJ Involvement	0.28	0	1	75
Strong Domestic Civil Society	0.63	0.12	0.96	70
Subject: Authoritarian Govt	0.69	0	1	75
Subject: Civil War	0.39	0	1	75
Regional Diffusion: Trace Antecedents	1.09	0	7	75
Regional Diffusion: Range of Abuses	1.93	0	9	75
Regional Diffusion: Subpoena	1.03	0	7	75
Regional Diffusion: Preserve Evidence	0.76	0	4	75
Global Diffusion	31.13	2	48	75
Democracy	0.66	0	1	68
Transitional	0.64	0	1	75

Robustness Checks

I try to keep the models in the main regression analysis as parsimonious and clean as possible while accounting for a range of potentially confounding factors. However, in this supplementary appendix, I conduct several robustness checks. In particular, I (1) re-run the analysis using a narrower definition of transitional truth commissions; (2) expound upon the post-conflict and post-autocracy models, controlling for different transition paths; and (3) deploy a Cox proportional hazards model, accounting for both the adoption of a truth commission and the time to the commission. Differences across different types of models—with different assumptions and, in the case of the Cox model, different underlying data structures—are to be expected. Fortunately, the few differences I observe do not reduce my confidence in the article's overall findings.

Evaluating a Narrower Definition of Transitional Truth Commissions

In the main text, I define a transitional truth commission as one adopted within 10 years of civil conflict, government killings of civilians, or transition from autocracy to democracy. But, are the results from the main analysis robust to a different definition of 'transitional'? Do the results hold up, given a narrower construct, specifically a 5-year, rather than 10-year, window following civil conflict, government killings of civilians, or transition from autocracy to democracy? Models A1 to A6 in Table A4 correspond to Models 1 to 6 in Table 1 in the main text. The differences I observe are minor and, as such, support the article's overall findings. The key explanatory variables from the main analysis that were statistically significant remain so, with the exception of the measure of a strong domestic civil society, which is statistically significant in two of six, rather than five of six, models. The results for HR-INGO naming and shaming are consistently strong.

Table A4: Transnational Advocacy and Truth Commission Adoption (transition = 5 years)

| | Truth Commission | | | | | |
| | Full Population | | | Post-Conflict | Post-Killing | Post-Autoc. |
	(A1)	(A2)	(A3)	(A4)	(A5)	(A6)
Strong Domestic Civil Society	3.14*	3.20*	2.04	-0.12	2.94	1.71
	(1.50)	(1.52)	(1.66)	(2.69)	(2.22)	(3.04)
HR-INGO Naming and Shaming	0.15**	0.15**	0.22**	0.24**	0.25**	0.26
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.17)
Network Access (*ln*)	0.28	0.39	3.40**	1.25	3.24+	8.72**
	(0.22)	(0.49)	(1.10)	(1.49)	(1.95)	(2.40)
Human Rights Respect	-0.07	-0.03	0.14	-0.02	0.56	-0.11
	(0.45)	(0.44)	(0.49)	(0.88)	(0.54)	(0.76)
Judicial Independence	-1.75	-2.12	-4.94	-2.48	-4.39	-2.01
	(2.35)	(2.74)	(3.34)	(5.94)	(4.06)	(5.09)
Veto Players	-2.88	-3.08	-2.61	2.36	-3.75	-7.14+
	(2.63)	(2.66)	(3.03)	(4.07)	(4.48)	(3.91)
Regional Diffusion		0.08	0.19	0.41	0.00	0.60+
		(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.34)	(0.23)	(0.35)
Global Diffusion		-0.01	-0.06	0.03	-0.04	-0.26*
		(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.12)
IGO Membership (*ln*)		-0.26	-0.80	1.88	-0.99	0.93
		(0.92)	(1.34)	(1.71)	(1.76)	(3.55)
GDP per capita (*ln*)			-0.91*	-1.18	-0.92	-1.65
			(0.44)	(0.77)	(0.68)	(1.04)
ODA as % of GDP			-1.97	-19.06	2.03	9.51
			(8.82)	(16.01)	(10.72)	(14.35)
Population (*ln*)			-1.25**	-1.86**	-0.90+	-2.38**
			(0.33)	(0.62)	(0.49)	(0.70)
Conflict Duration				0.09**		
				(0.03)		
Conflict Intensity				1.64		
				(1.17)		
Civilian Killings (*ln*)					0.16	
					(0.21)	
Democracy Breakdowns						-0.15
						(0.63)
Democratic Transition	0.49	0.43	0.28			
	(0.42)	(0.40)	(0.44)			
Conflict Termination	-1.06**	-1.09**	-0.64+			
	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.34)			
Constant	-4.89**	-4.26+	8.83	18.81	3.43	-3.35
	(1.50)	(2.31)	(6.02)	(14.31)	(8.27)	(14.51)
Observations	523	523	469	191	221	56

Note: Reported coefficients are log odds. Standard errors in parentheses.
All models report clustered standard errors by country.
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Varieties of Transition

I expound upon the post-conflict and post-autocracy models, controlling for the manner in which a conflict ended, namely in a peace agreement, government victory or rebel victory, and the nature of the democratic transition, namely whether it was led by elites in response to distributive grievances from the masses. Table A5 provides summary statistics for the new variables.

Table A5: Summary Statistics of New Variables for Varieties of Transition Supplementary Analysis

	Mean	*Min*	*Max*	*N*
Peace Agreement	0.12	0	1	269
Government Victory	0.20	0	1	269
Rebel Victory	0.07	0	1	269
Distributive Conflict Transition	0.58	0	1	60

For clarity, Model A7 in Table A6 corresponds to Model 4 in Table 1 in the main text. Model A8 then controls for the manner in which a conflict ends. In turn, Model A9 in Table A7 corresponds to Model 6 in Table 1 in the main text. Model A10 then controls for democratic transitions that are the result of distributive conflict.

Varieties of Civil Conflict Termination

It may be that the manner in which a conflict ends—in a peace agreement, victory for the government, or victory for rebels—matters for the likelihood of commission adoption. Relative to conflicts that end in a ceasefire—that is, without resolution of the incompatibility—or that taper off, falling below 25 battle-related deaths, conflicts that end in a peace agreement or in victory for one of the adversaries may be associated with a greater likelihood of commission adoption. As discussed in the main text, a commission is sometimes a provision of peace agreements. We might expect that conflicts that end in this way are generally positively associated with commission adoption. In terms of victory for one of the adversaries, both governments and rebels may, theoretically, pursue a commission to confront their involvement in the conflict and/or settle scores with their now-defeated adversary.

Main vs. supplementary analysis: When I control for different types of conflict termination, I observe one difference between the main and supplementary analyses. The explanatory variables that were positive, statistically significant predictors of truth commission adoption remain so, with the exception of the measure of the strength domestic civil society, which now falls below the 10% error level. When I control for whether a conflict ended in a peace agreement, government victory or rebel victory, relative to ceasefire or low activity, I observe three notable results. First, peace agreements and government victory are each associated with a greater likelihood of truth commission adoption (p<0.01). The coefficient for government victory is slightly larger than the coefficient for peace agreements. Among the control variables, I do not observe any notable differences between models.

Table A6: Truth Commission adoption, by Conflict Termination Type

DV = Truth Commission	(A7)		(A8)	
Strong Domestic Civil Society	3.27[+]	(1.78)	2.89	(1.88)
HR-INGO Naming and Shaming	0.20**	(0.05)	0.20**	(0.06)
Network Access (*ln*)	0.64	(0.61)	0.62	(0.56)
Human Rights Respect	-0.25	(0.85)	-0.06	(0.81)
Judicial Independence	-3.97	(3.59)	-2.76	(3.40)
Veto Players	0.17	(3.33)	-0.77	(3.63)
Regional Diffusion	0.44	(0.32)	0.43	(0.31)
Global Diffusion	-0.01	(0.06)	0.00	(0.06)
IGO Membership (*ln*)	-0.30	(0.85)	-0.14	(0.86)
GDP per capita (*ln*)	-0.01	(0.51)	-0.06	(0.44)
ODA as % of GDP	9.31	(9.30)	5.33	(8.58)
Population (*ln*)	-0.87[+]	(0.52)	-0.75	(0.50)
Conflict Duration	0.04	(0.03)	0.06[+]	(0.04)
Conflict Intensity	1.01*	(0.50)	1.17[+]	(0.63)
Peace Agreement			1.88**	(0.72)
Government Victory			2.29**	(0.59)
Rebel Victory			1.63	(1.47)
Constant	6.11	(10.69)	2.73	(10.19)
Observations	191		191	

Note: Reported coefficients are log odds. Standard errors in parentheses.
All models report clustered standard errors by country.
[+] $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Varieties of Democratic Transition

It is possible that there is systematic variation between democratic transitions that are the result of distributive conflict and transitions that are the result of non-distributive conflict. Haggard and Kaufman (2016) define distributive conflict transitions as ones in which authoritarian incumbents are threatened by the redistributive grievances of disadvantaged groups, motivating incumbents to compromise with or cede power to democratic challengers. In turn, non-distributive conflict transitions are ones in which mass mobilization does not occur; or, mass mobilization is not aimed at distributive grievances and/or is not a significant factor for elite withdrawal. Elites' ability to define their exit in both distributive conflict transitions and non-distributive conflict transitions likely influences truth commission adoption. Elites may oppose the adoption of a commission which would, ostensibly, investigate their involvement in human right violations and other abuses. Yet, if elites consider a truth commission to be a less-costly alternative to trials, they may actually prefer a truth commission as they leave power.

Main vs. supplementary analysis: I observe one noteworthy difference between the main and supplementary analyses. *Network access* remains a positive predictor of the outcome; however it is no longer statistically significant. Among the control variables, I do not observe any notable differences between models. Of course, future research should investigate not only if elites had control over their departure but also the nature and extent of their post-transition power. While officially out of power, these individuals could nonetheless be spoilers.

Table A7: Truth Commission adoption, by Regime Transition Type

DV = Truth Commission	(A9)		(A10)	
Strong Domestic Civil Society	-0.95	(3.68)	-0.75	(4.26)
HR-INGO Naming and Shaming	0.11	(0.14)	0.16	(0.13)
Network Access (*ln*)	7.15*	(3.20)	5.66	(4.13)
Human Rights Respect	-1.01	(0.77)	-1.48+	(0.88)
Judicial Independence	-4.33	(4.84)	-5.07	(5.03)
Veto Players	-3.52	(4.27)	-0.79	(5.71)
Regional Diffusion	0.22	(0.32)	0.39	(0.36)
Global Diffusion	-0.06	(0.10)	-0.06	(0.12)
IGO Membership (*ln*)	-1.46	(3.14)	-1.40	(2.60)
GDP per capita (*ln*)	-1.48	(1.04)	-0.61	(1.24)
ODA as % of GDP	-5.74	(12.81)	9.63	(21.81)
Population (*ln*)	-2.44**	(0.84)	-2.06+	(1.20)
Democracy Breakdowns	-0.21	(0.62)	-0.37	(0.83)
Distributive Conflict Transition			0.84	(1.19)
Constant	14.72	(12.12)	8.31	(10.91)
Observations	56		41	

Note: Reported coefficients are log odds. Standard errors in parentheses.
All models report clustered standard errors by country.
$^+$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Survival Analysis

It may be that the effect of the explanatory variables on the outcome wanes over time. Put differently, truth commissions may only be more likely to be adopted as a response to pressure from domestic and international civil society actors in the immediate aftermath of conflict, civilian killings, and transition to democracy. I evaluate the robustness of the results from the main analysis by considering, via a Cox proportional hazards model, not only whether a commission was adopted but also how long it took for it to be adopted. This is also known as a survival analysis. *As elaborated below, the results of this analysis generally comport with those of the logit analysis in the main text.*

For clarity, a Cox proportional hazards model predicts the hazard rate, $h_i(t)$, which denotes the rate at which a country i adopts a truth commission at time t, given that the country did not adopt a commission until time t. The Cox model considers not only whether a country adopted a commission but also when it adopted a commission, as the hazards rate is conditional on duration. Unlike logit and other parametric models, the Cox proportional hazards model supplies coefficient estimates without assuming the baseline hazard function.

The advantage of this estimation strategy is that the data are not bound by commission adoption during political transitions. As long as a country adopted a commission at some point after conflict, civilian killings, or autocracy, it is included. The censoring variable marks whether a commission was ever adopted and the time variable records the number of years until that commission was adopted. The disadvantage of this strategy is that we may be comparing apples and oranges, namely transitional and non-transitional commissions, which research tells us have different goals and methodologies. The data structure also forces us to collapse observations for the post-conflict sample.[23]

The civil conflict model, the civilian killings model, and the democratic transition model in Table A8

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[23]The Cox model that I produce using the R package, SURVIVAL, requires data that capture three things for every country: in the case of conflict, whether it has terminated an internal armed conflict since 1970; whether it adopted a truth commission after the conflict ended; and the time from the end of the conflict to the adoption of the truth commission. Because only one observation per country-year is allowed, we lose some information on countries that ended two or more internal conflicts in a given year since 1970, for example, countries where a government has fought two different rebel groups over two different incompatibilities. This is not an issue for the killings and autocracy data where only one transition event can occur for a given country-year. The smaller N notwithstanding, we observe statistically significant results for each of the key explanatory variables in the post-conflict survival analysis.

are estimated using the same variables used in Models 4, 5, and 6 in Table 1 in the main text. Central to our assessment of the robustness of the main analysis to this alternative modeling strategy is evaluating whether or not variables that are statistically significant in the logit analysis are also significant in the survival analysis, and that the direction, positive or negative, of the variables is the same. Differences across different types of models, with different assumptions and underlying data structures, *are* to be expected. But, the differences I observe do not reduce my confidence in the article's overall findings.

Main vs. supplementary analysis: Post-Conflict. First, with respect to statistical significance and, second, the direction of the key independent variables, I observe three notable differences between the results of the survival analysis and those of the logit analysis for the civil conflict sample. *Strong domestic civil society* is a significant predictor of the outcome at the 5% error level in the survival analysis, whereas it was only statistically significant at the 10% error level in the logit analysis. Similarly, *Network access* is statistically significant at the 5% error level in the survival analysis, whereas it was not statistically significant in the logit analysis. *HR-INGO naming and shaming* remains significant at the 5% error level.

Main vs. supplementary analysis: Post-Killings. With respect to the central independent variables, I observe two differences between the results of the survival analysis and those of the logit analysis for the civilian killings sample. In the survival analysis, *Strong domestic civil society* and *Network access* are not statistically significant predictors of the outcome, whereas they were statistically significant in the logit analysis. However, *HR-INGO naming and shaming* remains statistically significant ($p<0.01$).

Main vs. supplementary analysis: Post-Autocracy. In terms of the key explanatory variables, I observe one difference between the results of the survival analysis and those of the logit analysis for the democratic transition sample. *Network access* is statistically significant at the 1% error level in the survival analysis, whereas it was significant at the 5% error level in the logit analysis.

Despite the additional constraints imposed on the data by the Cox proportional hazards model, namely fewer degrees of freedom since I am also modeling the hazard function, the results of the survival analysis generally comport with those of the logit analysis in the main text.

Table A8: Single Observation Survival Analysis for Truth Commission adoption

	Truth Commission		
	Post-Conflict	Post-Killings	Post-Autoc.
	(A11)	(A12)	(A13)
Strong Domestic Civil Society	5.85* (2.33)	2.32 (0.85)	2.17 (2.28)
HR-INGO Naming and Shaming	0.19** (0.07)	0.23** (0.03)	0.07 (0.08)
Network Access (ln)	4.27* (1.57)	1.61 (0.59)	3.31** (0.97)
Human Rights Respect	−3.59** (1.15)	0.78* (0.20)	−0.81+ (0.46)
Judicial Independence	−10.82** (4.03)	−7.99+ (1.62)	−3.30 (2.93)
Veto Players	9.50+ (4.18)	0.48 (1.33)	−3.58* (2.33)
Regional Diffusion	0.47* (0.28)	0.40** (0.08)	0.01 (0.15)
Global Diffusion	−0.28** (0.08)	−0.09 (0.03)	−0.05 (0.06)
IGO Membership (ln)	−2.75+ (1.44)	−0.31 (0.57)	−0.74 (1.86)
GDP per capita (ln)	−1.65** (0.53)	−0.75 (0.22)	−0.34 (0.49)
ODA as % of GDP	14.95 (15.05)	−2.01 (2.85)	−2.56 (8.87)
Population (ln)	−2.04** (0.59)	−0.76** (0.16)	−0.78** (0.24)
Conflict Intensity	−0.23 (0.77)		
Conflict Duration	−0.06 (0.06)		
Civilian Casualties (ln)		0.0000 (0.0000)	
Democracy Breakdowns			−0.26 (0.25)
Observations	53	221	56
R^2	0.54	0.39	0.49
Max. Possible R^2	0.91	0.99	0.96
Log Likelihood	−42.03	−496.69	−72.69
Wald Test	51.05** (df = 14)	40.26** (df = 13)	81.43** (df = 13)
LR Test	41.23** (df = 14)	108.09** (df = 13)	37.81** (df = 13)
Score (Logrank) Test	23.16+ (df = 14)	105.26** (df = 13)	35.70** (df = 13)

Note: Reported coefficients are hazard ratios.   +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

An Interaction Effect?

Should we expect an interaction effect for the first outcome, truth commission adoption? There are two ways that we can think about TAN activism and the relationship between actors and actions at the domestic and international levels. The first theoretical model is *strategic complementarity*. Under this model, HR-INGOs more frequently name and shame countries where civil society is stronger. The logic of strategic complementarity undergirds Keck and Sikkink (1998), in particular their expectations about the 'boomerang' and when and where it it will matter for outcomes. In brief, HR-INGOs are interested in concentrating pressure from above *and* below because that is where they have the highest expectation of success.[24] Hence, a multiplicative interaction. However, research in this vein neglects the reality of *strategic substitution* in many places around the world. Under this model, HR-INGOs more frequently name and shame governments where civil society is weaker (see, for example, Murdie and Urpelainen 2014). Essentially, HR-INGOs 'mind the gap' for those domestic groups with limited political opportunity structures. This second theoretical model does not imply a positive interaction effect on a given outcome because HR-INGOs are not necessarily targeting countries where civil society is already strong. HR-INGOs expect they can still be successful without concentrated pressure from above and below.

Given that strategic substitution and strategic complementarity may both operate – and given that I do not have a strong prior about the dominance of one model over the other across my universe of cases – I do not bake in to my theory any expectations about a multiplicative interaction. In addition, my interviews and focus group suggest that my outcomes of interest are not necessarily more likely where we observe both high levels of domestic civil society strength and HR-INGO naming and shaming than

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[24]For more on this discussion, see Brysk (1993). See also Bob (2005) on INGOs' selective choice of Global South partners.

where we observe high levels of one but not the other. Different groups simply play different roles at different stages of truth commission processes.

All of this notwithstanding, I do explore an interaction effect. In Table A9, I produce a model, Model A15, in which I include an interaction term for the variables *Strong domestic civil society* and *HR-INGO naming and shaming*. Model A15 builds on Model A14 (the fully-specified full population analysis, or Model 3, from the main text). I find that the interaction term is positive; however, it is not statistically significant. *Strong domestic civil society* and *HR-INGO naming and shaming* remain statistically significant, albeit at a lower significance level.

Now, should we expect an interaction effect for the second outcome, truth commission quality? Again, my theory does not expect a multiplicative interaction effect. In addition, interview data suggests that, regardless of the strength of domestic civil society groups, a commission is unlikely to have a strong architecture and a clear direction when international experts, such as the ICTJ, are not part of the design process. Together, the quantitative and qualitative analyses offer evidence that TJ network members do develop partnerships, share information, and combine political resources to achieve their shared goals, but perhaps not in the ways that some envisage.

Table A9: Truth Commission adoption, with Interaction Effects

DV = Truth Commission	(A14)		(A15)	
Strong Domestic Civil Society	4.34*	(1.72)	3.90+	(2.03)
HR-INGO Naming and Shaming	0.24**	(0.07)	0.20+	(0.12)
Strong Domestic Civil Society*HR-INGO Naming and Shaming			0.07	(0.19)
Network Access (*ln*)	2.47**	(0.93)	2.46**	(0.90)
Human Rights Respect	-0.08	(0.53)	-0.06	(0.52)
Judicial Independence	-6.21*	(3.05)	-6.27*	(3.04)
Veto Players	-3.09	(2.66)	-3.21	(2.74)
Regional Diffusion	0.23	(0.15)	0.24	(0.15)
Global Diffusion	-0.08+	(0.04)	-0.08+	(0.04)
IGO Membership (*ln*)	-1.87+	(1.10)	-1.87+	(1.10)
GDP per capita (*ln*)	-0.49	(0.44)	-0.48	(0.43)
ODA as % of GDP	2.70	(7.70)	2.53	(7.69)
Population (*ln*)	-1.02**	(0.35)	-1.02**	(0.35)
Democratic Transition	0.17	(0.56)	0.19	(0.55)
Conflict Termination	-0.70+	(0.42)	-0.71+	(0.42)
Constant	11.51+	(6.81)	11.73+	(7.04)
Observations	469		469	

Note: Reported coefficients are log odds. Standard errors in parentheses.
All models report clustered standard errors by country.
$^+$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Changing INGO Strategy?

In addition to variation in the influence of TJ network members across countries, it is also worth discussing how their role has changed over time. When truth commissions were still a relatively new phenomenon, experts' central goal was communicating *what* TJ is and the role that truth commissions can play in the aftermath of political violence. To do this, international conferences—involving academics, activists, and attorneys—were convened. There, participants studied previous experiences and explored what modalities of justice, and specifically truth commissions, were possible in the country under consideration. At this time, there was not a rich and extensive institutional memory; individuals carried it with them. However, with the development of the ICTJ, these experiences have been recorded and preserved. So, the goal post has shifted from adoption to adoption *and* quality. Today, experts dedicate less time to communicating the *what* or *why* of a truth commission and focus more on the *how*, in particular how to design a strong commission and, very importantly, how to articulate it from a national perspective. Across my

interviews, practitioners emphasized that the first item on the agenda is clarifying that the country in question can not and will not have the experience South Africa did but, rather, one that reflects its unique opportunities and challenges. This is the only way, interviewees suggested, that a commission has a chance of success. So, international experts, notably from the ICTJ, are helping countries adapt, even innovate on, what has already been done.

Other Truth Commission Design Considerations

Hayner and González revealed an additional element of commission design that I had not initially considered but that I realize now is quite important: the selection of commission officials. Based on their professional experience, presidential- or parliamentary-appointments are not ideal; public nominations are preferable, as merit, not political connections, becomes the target. While not directly anticipated by my theory, the increasing use of merit-based selection of commission officials has been made possible by international consultants, namely the ICTJ. Hayner relayed, "That level of international experience and technical input is valuable."

Interview and Focus Group Protocol

Each interview began with a brief discussion of my current research on truth commissions and a quick overview of the article's theory and preliminary findings. Interviewees were asked what they believe to be the relative importance of domestic and international groups in the establishment of truth commissions, among other accountability mechanisms, and how important they think domestic-international partnerships are. Beyond these specific items, I invited interviewees to share their experiences working in the field and discuss successes and failures, joys and frustrations. Similar to the interviews, the focus group began with a brief discussion of my research agenda. Unlike the interviews, however, I did not provide an overview of the paper's theory and findings. I simply said that I was interested in re-centering civil society in TJ research and international relations scholarship more generally.