Supplementary Appendix to:
"Human Rights versus National Interests: Shifting US Public Attitudes on the International Criminal Court," by Kelebogile Zvobgo, in *International Studies Quarterly*

Appendix A   Additional Tests

## A.1   Financing the Court: A Secondary Assessment of Human Rights and National Interest Frames

I conduct a secondary assessment of human rights and national interest frames, this time inquiring into attitudes about providing financial support to the ICC, regardless of US membership. Figure A1 and Table A1 show the percentage of participants who approved of the US providing financial support to the ICC across each of the treatment groups. I find that the human rights treatment increases approval relative to the control treatment by 12 percentage points, from 44.7% to 57.2%—a difference statistically significant at the 5 percent error level. In contrast, the national interest treatment does not have a significant effect on approval relative to control treatment. Interestingly, among individuals in the control group, support for *financing* the Court is lower than support for *joining* the Court by nearly 11 percentage points (see Table 3 for comparison). This can be interpreted as evidence of another quality of national interests: Americans may be more prepared for the US to join the ICC than to help finance its operations and, by extension, its effectiveness. Presumably, participants prefer for someone else to allocate resources to the Court.

Table A1: Approval Rates by Treatment Group for *Finance Court*

Treatment group	N	Proportion approval	Difference	Standard deviation	tstat	p-value
Control	259	0.447				
Human Rights	243	0.572	0.12414	0.495	2.80	0.005
National Interest	270	0.400	-0.0478764	0.491	-1.11	0.266
Competitive	248	0.548	.1005106	0.499	2.27	0.024

Compared to individuals in the control treatment, 54.8% of individuals in the competitive treatment support financing the Court—a 10-percentage-point *increase* from the control treatment that is statistically significant at the 5 percent error level. This finding suggests that, among individuals who must more consciously deliberate the costs and benefits of U.S. involvement with the ICC, membership is perceived as less costly than financial contributions.

Figure A1: Treatment Effects with 95% Confidence Intervals, All Respondents, DV = *Finance Court*

A.2 Interaction Effects: IO Attitudes

To assess whether IO attitudes moderated the treatment effects, I used four questions that were randomly asked before and after the treatment asking whether the respondent agrees that IOs (1) are useful for addressing practical world problems, (2) accomplish their missions, (3) are efficient with their resources, and (4) are biased against some countries. I use binary versions of these variables, *IOs Useful*, *IOs Accomplish Missions*, *IOs Efficient with Resources*, and *IOs Biased Against Some Countries*, that each equal one if the participant indicated that she somewhat or strongly agreed. I then interacted the treatment indicators with the IO attitude indicators.

As seen in Model A5 of Table A2, I estimate three noteworthy effects among the interacted variables.[19] First, participants in the national interest and competitive treatments who think that IOs are biased against some countries had a stronger, negative reaction to the treatments (p<0.10 and p<0.01, respectively), compared to participants who do not think that IOs are biased against some countries. Second, participants in the competitive treatment who think IOs are efficient with their resources had a stronger, positive reaction to the treatment (p<0.10) compared to participants who do not think IOs are efficient with their resources.

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[19]For clarity, Models A1 to A4 correspond with Models 1 to 4 in the main regression analysis in the core text (Table 4).

Table A2: Interaction of Treatments and IO Attitudes

	DV = *Join Court*				
	(A1)	(A2)	(A3)	(A4)	(A5)
Human Rights Frame	0.367*	0.488*	0.486*	0.547**	1.135+
	(0.184)	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.209)	(0.583)
National Interest Frame	-0.571**	-0.676***	-0.683***	-0.654***	-0.0528
	(0.176)	(0.188)	(0.189)	(0.199)	(0.608)
Competitive	-0.337+	-0.305	-0.323+	-0.298	0.380
	(0.178)	(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.201)	(0.613)
Information	0.0789	0.0407	0.0406	0.0609	0.0536
	(0.128)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.144)	(0.147)
Caucasian		0.263	0.265	0.243	0.265
		(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.183)	(0.186)
Female		0.0619	0.105	0.00705	0.0465
		(0.139)	(0.143)	(0.151)	(0.154)
Democrat		1.039***	1.040***	0.684***	0.683***
		(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.170)	(0.173)
Republican		-0.452*	-0.450*	-0.495*	-0.516*
		(0.183)	(0.186)	(0.202)	(0.205)
Bachelor's Degree		0.0933	0.0604	0.125	0.0973
		(0.137)	(0.140)	(0.149)	(0.151)
Age Under 40		0.622***	0.674***	0.652***	0.705***
		(0.141)	(0.147)	(0.155)	(0.158)
Prior Knowledge of ICC			0.168	0.295+	0.328*
			(0.147)	(0.156)	(0.159)
Regularly Reads News			0.0213	0.000149	0.0314
			(0.160)	(0.169)	(0.173)
Regularly Watches News			0.0813	0.00728	0.00365
			(0.155)	(0.163)	(0.165)
IOs Useful				1.120***	1.610***
				(0.203)	(0.428)
IOs Accomplish Mission				0.419*	0.206
				(0.170)	(0.343)
IOs Efficient with Resources				0.376*	0.0715
				(0.169)	(0.331)
IOs Biased Against Some Countries				-0.439**	0.196
				(0.149)	(0.298)
Human Rights Frame*IOs Useful					-0.815
					(0.575)
National Interest Frame*IOs Useful					-0.802
					(0.599)
Competitive*IOs Useful					-0.341
					(0.605)
Human Rights Frame*IOs Accomplish Mission					0.547
					(0.488)
National Interest Frame*IOs Accomplish Mission					0.757
					(0.481)
Competitive*IOs Accomplish Mission					-0.362
					(0.489)
Human Rights Frame*IOs Efficient with Resources					0.304
					(0.507)
National Interest Frame*IOs Efficient with Resources					0.113
					(0.466)
Competitive*IOs Efficient with Resources					0.923+
					(0.475)
Human Rights Frame*IOs Biased Against Some Countries					-0.688
					(0.442)
National Interest Frame*IOs Biased Against Some Countries					-0.779+
					(0.412)
Competitive*IOs Biased Against Some Countries					-1.143**
					(0.425)
Constant	0.198	-0.785**	-0.948**	-1.851***	-2.416***
	(0.143)	(0.268)	(0.295)	(0.359)	(0.527)
Observations	1020	1015	1015	1015	1015

Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A.3 Interaction Effects: UN Attitudes

Next, to assess whether UN attitudes moderated the treatment effects, I used four questions that were randomly asked before and after the treatment asking whether the respondent agrees that the UN (1) is useful for addressing practical world problems, (2) accomplishes its mission, (3) is efficient with its resources, and (4) is biased against some countries. I use binary versions of these variables, *UN Useful*, *UN Accomplish Missions*, *UN Efficient with Resources*, and *UN Biased Against Some Countries*, that each equal one if the participant indicated that she somewhat or strongly agreed. I then interacted the treatment indicators with the UN attitude indicators.

As seen in Model A5 of Table A3, I estimate three noteworthy effects among the interacted variables.[20] Participants in the human rights, national interest, and competitive treatments who think the UN is generally efficient with its resources had a stronger, positive reaction to the treatments ($p<0.01$, $p<0.10$, and $p<0.05$, respectively), compared to participants who do not think the UN is generally efficient with its resources.

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[20]For clarity, Models A1 to A3 correspond with Models 1 to 3 in the main regression analysis in the core text (Table 4), while Model A4 corresponds to Model 5 in the core text.

Table A3: Interaction of Treatments and UN Attitudes

	(A1)	(A2)	DV = *Join Court* (A3)	(A4)	(A5)
Human Rights Frame	0.367* (0.184)	0.488* (0.196)	0.486* (0.196)	0.568** (0.207)	0.632 (0.532)
National Interest Frame	-0.571** (0.176)	-0.676*** (0.188)	-0.683*** (0.189)	-0.665*** (0.198)	-0.633 (0.486)
Competitive	-0.337+ (0.178)	-0.305 (0.190)	-0.323+ (0.190)	-0.304 (0.199)	-0.0185 (0.498)
Information	0.0789 (0.128)	0.0407 (0.136)	0.0406 (0.136)	0.0280 (0.142)	0.00587 (0.145)
Caucasian		0.263 (0.173)	0.265 (0.174)	0.273 (0.182)	0.216 (0.184)
Female		0.0619 (0.139)	0.105 (0.143)	-0.00950 (0.150)	-0.0223 (0.152)
Democrat		1.039*** (0.159)	1.040*** (0.159)	0.724*** (0.169)	0.729*** (0.171)
Republican		-0.452* (0.183)	-0.450* (0.186)	-0.396* (0.198)	-0.405* (0.201)
Bachelor's Degree		0.0933 (0.137)	0.0604 (0.140)	0.0892 (0.147)	0.0635 (0.149)
Age Under 40		0.622*** (0.141)	0.674*** (0.147)	0.624*** (0.155)	0.608*** (0.156)
Prior Knowledge of ICC			0.168 (0.147)	0.327* (0.156)	0.303+ (0.158)
Regularly Reads News			0.0213 (0.160)	0.0352 (0.168)	0.0451 (0.170)
Regularly Watches News			0.0813 (0.155)	0.0525 (0.163)	0.0870 (0.165)
UN Useful				0.545** (0.191)	0.793* (0.403)
UN Accomplishes Mission				0.596** (0.188)	1.179** (0.403)
UN Efficient with Resources				0.185 (0.180)	-0.828* (0.400)
UN Biased Against Some Countries				-0.534*** (0.151)	-0.277 (0.306)
Human Rights Frame*UN Useful					-0.617 (0.549)
National Interest Frame*UN Useful					-0.0584 (0.550)
Competitive*UN Useful					-0.258 (0.556)
Human Rights Frame*UN Accomplishes Mission					-0.695 (0.542)
National Interest Frame*UN Accomplishes Mission					-0.623 (0.546)
Competitive*UN Accomplishes Mission					-0.780 (0.560)
Human Rights Frame*UN Efficient with Resources					1.788** (0.550)
National Interest Frame*UN Efficient with Resources					0.910+ (0.527)
Competitive*UN Efficient with Resources					1.312* (0.540)
Human Rights Frame*UN Biased Against Some Countries					-0.122 (0.458)
National Interest Frame*UN Biased Against Some Countries					-0.199 (0.415)
Competitive*UN Biased Against Some Countries					-0.661 (0.429)
Constant	0.198 (0.143)	-0.785** (0.268)	-0.948** (0.295)	-1.379*** (0.343)	-1.423** (0.452)
Observations	1020	1015	1015	1015	1015

Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A.4   Interaction Effects: World Affairs Knowledge

Finally, to assess whether knowledge of world affairs moderated the treatment effects, I used three post-treatment questions about the respondent's prior knowledge of the ICC and how often the respondent reads and watches the news. *ICC Previous* is a binary variable, and I use a binary version of *Reads News* and *Watches News*, that each equal one if the participant indicated that she reads the news or watches the news daily. I then interacted the treatment indicators with the world affairs knowledge indicators.

As seen in Model A5 of Table A4, I estimate just one noteworthy effects among the interacted variables.[21] Participants in the competitive treatment who watch the news daily had a stronger, negative reaction to the treatment (p<0.001), compared to participants who do not watch the news daily.

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[21]For clarity, Models A1 to A3 correspond with Models 1 to 3 in the main regression analysis in the core text (Table 4).

Table A4: Interaction of Treatments and World Affairs Knowledge

| | DV = *Join Court* | | | |
	(A1)	(A2)	(A3)	(A4)
Human Rights Frame	0.367*	0.488*	0.486*	1.047**
	(0.184)	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.343)
National Interest Frame	-0.571**	-0.676***	-0.683***	-0.485
	(0.176)	(0.188)	(0.189)	(0.328)
Competitive	-0.337+	-0.305	-0.323+	0.367
	(0.178)	(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.333)
Information	0.0789	0.0407	0.0406	0.0424
	(0.128)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.138)
Caucasian		0.263	0.265	0.247
		(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.177)
Female		0.0619	0.105	0.105
		(0.139)	(0.143)	(0.144)
Democrat		1.039***	1.040***	1.039***
		(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.161)
Republican		-0.452*	-0.450*	-0.478*
		(0.183)	(0.186)	(0.190)
Bachelor's Degree		0.0933	0.0604	0.0413
		(0.137)	(0.140)	(0.142)
Age Under 40		0.622***	0.674***	0.665***
		(0.141)	(0.147)	(0.149)
Prior Knowledge of ICC			0.168	0.329
			(0.147)	(0.282)
Regularly Reads News			0.0213	0.0161
			(0.160)	(0.306)
Regularly Watches News			0.0813	0.733*
			(0.155)	(0.299)
Human Rights Frame*Prior Knowledge of ICC				-0.298
				(0.410)
National Interest Frame*Prior Knowledge of ICC				-0.130
				(0.396)
Competitive*Prior Knowledge of ICC				-0.202
				(0.410)
Human Rights Frame*Regularly Reads News				-0.382
				(0.445)
National Interest Frame*Regularly Reads News				0.272
				(0.440)
Competitive*Regularly Reads News				0.212
				(0.455)
Human Rights Frame*Regularly Watches News				-0.445
				(0.429)
National Interest Frame*Regularly Watches News				-0.687
				(0.420)
Competitive*Regularly Watches News				-1.531***
				(0.437)
Constant	0.198	-0.785**	-0.948**	-1.274***
	(0.143)	(0.268)	(0.295)	(0.340)
Observations	1020	1015	1015	1015

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A.5 Political Action around the ICC

Tables A5 to A8 present the results of additional difference-in-means tests discussed in the core text for political action around the ICC suggested/prompted in the survey, specifically calling one or both of one's US Senators, donating to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims, writing a letter to one or both of one's Senators, and the content of the letter.

Table A5: Call Senator by Treatment Group

Treatment group	N	Proportion approval	Difference	Standard deviation	tstat	p-value
Control	259	0.169				
Human Rights	243	0.242	0.0729142	0.429	2.03	0.043
National Interest	270	0.207	0.0375232	0.406	1.10	0.271
Competitive	248	0.217	0.0478578	0.413	1.36	0.173

Table A6: Donation Rates by Treatment Group

Treatment group	N	Proportion approval	Difference	Standard deviation	tstat	p-value
Control	259	0.270				
Human Rights	243	0.342	0.0712935	0.475	1.74	0.083
National Interest	270	0.337	0.0667668	0.473	1.67	0.096
Competitive	248	0.270	-0.000109	0.445	-0.00	0.998

Table A7: Write Senator Rates by Treatment Group

Treatment group	N	Proportion approval	Difference	Standard deviation	tstat	p-value
Control	259	0.096				
Human Rights	243	0.098	0.0022403	0.298	0.08	0.933
National Interest	270	0.081	-0.0150436	0.274	-0.61	0.544
Competitive	248	0.096	0.0002491	0.296	0.01	0.992

Table A8: Support Letter Rates by Treatment Group

Treatment group	N	Proportion approval	Difference	Standard deviation	tstat	p-value
Control	25	0.92				
Human Rights	23	0.826	-0.093913	0.388	-0.97	0.336
National Interest	21	0.761	-0.1580952	0.436	-1.49	0.143
Competitive	24	0.791	-0.1283333	0.415	-1.28	0.207

Appendix B Experimental Vignettes

B.1 Information Treatment

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the first permanent, treaty-based, international criminal court. It is seated in The Hague, The Netherlands. The ICC was established in 1998 to hold accountable perpetrators of the most serious crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.

- Genocide is killing and injuring with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.

- Crimes against humanity are widespread attacks directed against a civilian population, including murder, slavery, deportation, unlawful imprisonment, torture, and rape.

- War crimes include willful killing, torture, unjustified and extensive property destruction, taking of hostages, and rape.

- Crimes of aggression involve the use of armed force by a country against the sovereignty of another country.

Members of the ICC are countries that have signed and ratified the Rome Statue which governs the ICC. Member countries recognize the Court's right to investigate and prosecute their citizens in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.

Most countries that join the ICC are unlikely to ever be subject to ICC proceedings. All a country would need to do to prevent an ICC case would be to carry out its own investigation and, if indicated by the facts, prosecute individuals alleged to have committed serious crimes.

The United States is currently not a member of the ICC but it could become one in the future.

B.2 Human Rights Treatment

Before the International Criminal Court (ICC) was created, international criminal tribunals were established on an as-needed basis following conflicts during which serious crimes (e.g., willful killing, rape, torture, unlawful imprisonment, etc.) were committed. These tribunals include the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials in Germany and Japan following World War II, as well as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), following the wars in the Balkans, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), following the Rwandan genocide.

The U.S. has long been a defender of the international investigation and prosecution of serious crimes. The U.S. was one of the leading supporters of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. The U.S. also provided financial and logistical support to ICTY and ICTR, as well as the ICC. If the U.S. were to join the ICC, the U.S. could promote American democratic values, such as accountability and human rights, by helping the Court to investigate and prosecute individuals alleged to have committed serious crimes.

B.3 National Interest Treatment

Currently if, in the course of executing their duties, United States military personnel order or commit serious crimes (e.g., willful killing, rape, torture, unlawful imprisonment, etc.), these individuals can be prosecuted in U.S. domestic courts. The U.S. government has sufficient resources and institutional

capacity to fairly investigate, prosecute, and, where appropriate, convict and sentence these individuals for committing such crimes.

However, if the U.S. were to join the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the ICC was not satisfied with the U.S.'s efforts to hold accountable the accused individuals, the Court could take over the investigations and prosecutions. The U.S. military has long been engaged in many different places around the world. And, there is opposition to U.S. involvement in some of these contexts. If the U.S. were to join the ICC, the Court could unfairly target U.S. leaders and military personnel for political reasons.